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“The terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their counterparts) 
were understood to refer to those fundamental rights and liberties 
specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by all 
persons.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has undermined its Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence by conflating the distinction between implied 
rights and unenumerated rights. Broadly speaking, implied rights are 
those that, based on a reasonable interpretation of the text, are inferable 
from the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights. This includes, for 
example, the right to associate under the First Amendment and the right 
to “effective” assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.2 
Essentially, implied rights are ancillary to and necessary for the full 
realization of the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights’ express 
provisions. Conversely, unenumerated fundamental rights, such as the 
right to privacy and the right to make consensual sexual choices,3 exist 
independently of the Constitution’s text but have the same force as 
enumerated rights. 
This Article argues that the Court’s failure to distinguish between 
implied and unenumerated rights is traceable to its misplaced reliance on 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than on the 
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, when 
creating new rights.4 The Due Process Clause ensures that citizens are 
not deprived of life, liberty, or property without fair processes, whereas 
 
 1.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 2.  See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to effective assistance of 
counsel); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958) (right to association); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(right to association). 
 3.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a law banning sodomy 
between same-sex couples). 
 4.  See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”); U.S. CONST., amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); see also Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (holding that “[a]lthough a literal reading of the Clause 
might suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, 
for at least 105 years . . . the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as 
well”). 
2
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the Ninth Amendment guarantees, and the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause protects, unenumerated fundamental rights existing 
independently of the Constitution.5 Given that many fundamental rights 
relating to privacy and liberty, such as the right engage in consensual 
sexual conduct and to have pre-viability abortions, are not inferable from 
the text of the Due Process Clause (or any other provision), they should 
have been characterized as unenumerated, not implied, rights and 
grounded in the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.6 The point, therefore, is not to say that the right to abortion is 
not a fundamental right. It is to say that the Ninth Amendment and the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause are the proper means by which to 
recognize such rights.7 
By adopting this framework and distinguishing between implied 
and unenumerated rights, the Court would have anchored its 
fundamental rights jurisprudence more firmly in the Constitution’s text 
without unduly constraining its authority to address abuses of the 
democratic process.8 As discussed below, this framework is consistent 
with the Constitution’s structural provisions, including the Supremacy 
Clause and the selective incorporation doctrine,9 which establish a 
system of federalism that ensures equal enjoyment of fundamental rights 
and harmony between the federal and state court systems.10 
If the Court anchors unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment 
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause it will create a three-tiered 
fundamental rights paradigm that protects express, implied, and 
unenumerated rights. Currently, only the first two categories have been 
 
 5.  See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST., amend. IX. 
 6.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 
(1961) (holding that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”); Planned Parenthood, 
505 U.S. 833 (affirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (holding that 
the states may not place an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy).  
 7.  See U.S. CONST., amend. IX; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
 8.  See U.S. CONST., amend. IX; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
 9.  See U.S. CONST., art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763 (2010) (recognizing a 
“process of ‘selective incorporation,’ [in which] the Court began to hold that the Due Process 
Clause incorporates rights contained in the first eight Amendments”). 
 10.  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that “the 
terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their counterparts) were understood to refer to those 
fundamental rights and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by all 
persons”) (internal citation omitted). 
3
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extensively developed by the Court, in part because in Griswold v. 
Connecticut11 the Court conflated implied and unenumerated rights 
when holding that the right to privacy was among those that emanate 
from penumbras12 in the text. Had the Court relied more heavily on the 
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it would 
have established a rights-creating framework that was capable of broader 
application than its current due process formulation. The Table below 
sets forth a proposed, three-tiered paradigm for recognizing express, 
implied, and unenumerated rights. 
 
THE THREE CATEGORIES OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
TYPE OF 
RIGHT 
EXPRESS IMPLIED UNENUMERATED 
SOURCE(S) THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 
DERIVED 
FROM THE 
FIRST EIGHT 
AMENDMENTS 
TO ENSURE 
FULL 
ENJOYMENT OF 
EXPRESS 
RIGHTS 
THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT 
AND THE 
PRIVILEGES OR 
IMMUNITIES 
CLAUSE, WHICH 
GUARANTEE 
RIGHTS “IMPLICIT 
IN THE CONCEPT 
OF ORDERED 
LIBERTY” 
POSITIVE 
AND 
NEGATIVE 
RIGHTS 
(EXAMPLES) 
FREE SPEECH, 
THE RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS, 
THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL, 
FREEDOM 
FROM CRUEL 
AND 
UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT 
FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION, 
EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY, PRE-
VIABILITY 
ABORTION, AND 
CONSENSUAL 
SEXUAL 
CONDUCT. 
 
This framework disentangles implied rights from unenumerated 
rights, situates the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities 
 
 11.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 12.  Id. 
4
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Clause as the sources of unenumerated rights, and eliminates the Due 
Process Clause from fundamental rights jurisprudence. The result is a 
jurisprudence more closely aligned with the text that enables the Court 
to redress abuses that occur in the democratic and political process. 
As the chart illustrates, the proposed framework would provide that 
express rights derive from the Bill of Rights. Implied rights also derive 
from the first eight amendments, and those rights function to ensure full 
enjoyment of the Constitution’s express rights. The primary change to 
the Court’s current taxonomy would be to recognize unenumerated 
rights as arising from the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, which together guarantee rights “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”13 This framework, as developed later, would 
mean that unenumerated rights currently recognized as part of the 
Court’s Substantive Due Process jurisprudence would, instead, be 
understood as deriving from the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. Recognizing the Ninth Amendment and the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as the source of the Constitution’s 
unenumerated rights would also provide a basis to recognize other 
unenumerated rights that are implicit in a free society. 
Part II provides historical background regarding the Court’s power 
to create unenumerated rights, and focuses on the selective incorporation 
doctrine, the Supremacy and the Privileges or Immunities Clauses, and 
the Ninth Amendment. Part III argues that the Court should overrule the 
Slaughter-House Cases and interpret the Ninth Amendment and the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause to create principled yet restrained 
unenumerated rights jurisprudence. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: SELECTIVE INCORPORATION, 
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, AND THE FEDERAL POWER TO CREATE 
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 
The selective incorporation doctrine and Supremacy Clause are the 
centerpieces of cooperative federalism.14 These, along with the Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, create a 
jurisprudence that supports judicial recognition of unenumerated rights. 
 
 13.  Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 14.  See generally, Sarah C. Rispin, Cooperative Federalism and Constructive Waiver of State 
Sovereign Immunity, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2003). 
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A. The Selective Incorporation Doctrine 
Originally, the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal 
Government.15 In U.S. v. Cruikshank,16 the Court held that the right to 
bear arms under the Second Amendment “means no more than that it 
shall not be infringed by Congress.”17 In subsequent cases, however, the 
Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to 
apply some provisions in the Bill of Rights to the states. In De Jonge v. 
Oregon,18 the Court held that the right to peaceably assemble under the 
First Amendment was a “fundamental righ[t] . . . safeguarded by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”19 Likewise, in Chicago, 
B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago,20 the Court applied the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause to the states when it held that property may not be taken 
for public use without just compensation.21 As Justice Alito stated in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago,22 the Court “viewed the due process 
question as entirely separate from the question whether a right was a 
privilege or immunity of national citizenship.”23 
In McDonald, however, the Court was careful to note the rights 
“protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause were 
only those that were ‘of such a nature that they are included in the 
conception of due process of law.’”24 Put differently, although “it was 
‘possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight 
Amendments against National action [might] also be safeguarded against 
state action,’”25 this was “not because those rights are enumerated in the 
first eight Amendments.”26 
In identifying “the boundaries of due process,”27 the Court has 
 
 15.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010) (citing Barron v. City of 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)). 
 16.  92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that the Second Amendment only applied to the federal 
government); see also Miller v. Tex., 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894); Presser v. Ill., 116 U.S. 252, 265 
(1886). 
 17.  92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).  
 18.  299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
 19.  Id. at 364. 
 20.  166 U.S. 226, 248 (1897). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 743 (2010). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 759 (quoting Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1999)); see also Adamson v. Cal., 
332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233 U.S. (1936); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 25.  McDonald 561 U.S. at 760 (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 99). 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.  
6
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relied on the “immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very 
idea of free government which no member of the Union may 
disregard.”28 In Palko v. Connecticut,29 the Court held that the Due 
Process Clause protects rights that are “the very essence of a scheme of 
ordered liberty”30 and essential to “a fair and enlightened system of 
justice.”31 This includes rights that are “so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”32 In Duncan 
v. Louisiana,33 the Court framed the fundamental rights inquiry as 
whether “a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the 
particular protection.”34 
On the other hand, the Court is “not hesitant to hold that a right set 
out in the Bill of Rights failed to meet the test for inclusion within the 
protection of the Due Process Clause.”35 For example, the Court has 
refused to incorporate the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
requirement of a grand jury indictment in criminal cases.36 Significantly, 
even where the Court incorporates a provision in the Bill of Rights, the 
remedies for violations of that right may differ at the federal and state 
level. For example, at the federal level criminal defendants are entitled 
to counsel in all criminal cases, whereas the states are required to 
provide counsel for convictions that, absent counsel, would be “lacking 
in . . . fundamental fairness.”37 
B.The Supremacy Clause and Cooperative Federalism 
The Supremacy Clause is set forth in Article VI, Clause 2, and 
states in relevant part as follows: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 30.  Id. at 325. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
 33.  391 U.S. 145 (1968).  
 34.  Id. at 149, n.14. 
 35.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761 (2010). 
 36.  See, e.g., Hurtado v. Cal., 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
 37.  See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), rev’d on other grounds by Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
7
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withstanding.38 
It is well-settled that “federal law is as much the law of the several 
States as are the laws passed by their legislatures”39 and that “federal 
and state law ‘together form one system of jurisprudence,’ . . . having 
jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.”40 As such, 
state courts have a “coordinate responsibility to enforce that law 
according to their regular modes of procedure.”41 This includes an 
affirmative duty “to safeguard and enforce the right of every citizen 
without reference to the particular exercise of governmental power from 
which the right may have arisen, if only the authority to enforce such 
right comes generally within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by 
the government creating them.”42 
Several principles inform the Court’s Supremacy Clause 
jurisprudence. First, “[a] state court may not deny a federal right, when 
the parties and controversy are properly before it, in the absence of 
‘valid excuse.’”43 Second, the Clause prohibits state courts from 
disregarding federal law based on a policy disagreement.44 In Howlett v. 
Rose,45 the Court stated as follows: 
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the pol-
icy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the State are free to de-
cline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible because it presupposes what in 
legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of 
the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke 
for all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy 
for all. That policy is as much the policy of [the State] as if the act had 
emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected according-
ly in the courts of the State.46 
However, state courts may refuse to exercise jurisdiction if the 
reason for doing so is “a neutral state rule regarding the administration 
of the courts.”47 
 
 38.  See U.S. CONST., art. VI, Cl. 2. 
 39.  Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734 (2009) (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 
130, 136-37 (1876)). 
 40.  Id. at 734-35 
 41.  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990). 
 42.  Id. at 367-68 (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 
(1916)). 
 43. Id. at 370 (quoting Douglas v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387–88 (1929)).  
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See id. 
 46.  Id. at 371 (quoting Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912)). 
 47.  Id. at 372. 
8
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The Court’s precedent establishes that “when state or local law 
conflicts with federal law, federal law prevails”48 even though the 
federal law should not be interpreted to “endorse every potential remedy 
for violation of that rule.”49 Additionally, federal law can preempt state 
law “where Congress has expressly preempted state law; where 
Congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an 
entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law; or where 
federal law conflicts with state law.”50 These principles enable the type 
of federalism where federal and state courts collectively enforce the 
rights created under federal law.51 
 State courts are typically not bound, however, by decisions of the 
lower federal courts. In U.S. ex. rel. Lawrence v. Woods,52 the Seventh 
Circuit held that “the state courts and the lower federal courts have the 
same responsibility and occupy the same position; there is a parallelism 
but not paramountcy for both sets of courts are governed by the same 
reviewing authority of the [U.S. Supreme Court].”53 The court stated as 
follows: 
Finality of determination in respect to the laws of the United States 
rests in the Supreme Court of the United States. Until the Supreme 
Court of the United States has spoken, state courts are not precluded 
from exercising their own judgment upon questions of federal law. 
They are not precluded by, though they should give respectful consid-
eration to, the decisions of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and 
District Courts.54 
Conversely, some courts have held that decisions of the lower 
federal courts are binding on the states.55 
As a practical matter, the latter view makes more sense. 
Unnecessary conflict and incongruity would result between the state and 
federal courts, particularly because the U.S. Supreme Court hears very 
few cases each year.56 In fact, the Supreme Court supervisory authority 
has changed substantially in recent years: 
 
 48.  Planned Parenthood of Kan. and Mid-Missouri v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 823 (10th Cir. 
2014). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 531 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 51.  See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372-73. 
 52.  432 F. 2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970).  
 53.  Id. at 1075 (quoting State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 402-03 (1965)). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See, e.g., Handy v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 So. 530 (1935). 
 56.  See Success Rate of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, Supreme 
Court Press, http://www.supremecourtpress.com/chance_of_success.html. 
9
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In the nation’s formative years, state courts were subject to as-of-right 
review in the Supreme Court for denying any federal claim of right. 
For many years, the Supreme Court had the capacity to review most 
major state court decisions on questions of federal law and thus served 
as a general supervisor of the state courts. Today, the Supreme Court 
reviews an average of only twelve state court decisions each term, 
meaning that “state courts . . . exercise final authority in virtually eve-
ry federal question case that comes before them.” In this changed 
world, the lower federal courts arguably should take the lead in inter-
preting federal law, even if that was not the role initially intended for 
them.57 
Indeed, state courts “play a vastly different role in the adjudication 
of federal issues than they did during the early Republic”58 because they 
now “enjoy far greater decisional independence.”59 
Thus, if state courts refused to follow the decisions of lower federal 
courts, the principles underlying cooperative federalism and the 
Supremacy Clause would all but vanish and be displaced by irresolvable 
conflicts between the state and federal courts over the meaning of 
federal law. As a result, citizens would be “left confused about what the 
law requires of them and sometimes bear the added costs of complying 
with two (or more) different legal standards.”60 The Court foresaw this 
problem in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee61 where it emphasized “the 
importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the 
whole United States”62 and “decried the ‘mischiefs’ that would result 
were the Supreme Court deprived of its ability to ensure such uniformity 
by reviewing state court decisions on federal questions.”63 As Professor 
Frost notes, the “disuniformity created by a split between a state 
supreme court and its regional federal court of appeals is especially 
problematic because it leaves citizens in a single state subject to 
conflicting legal standards.”64 
 
 57.  See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal 
Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 75 (2015) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 92. 
 61.  14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
 62.  Frost, supra note 57, at 92 (emphasis in original) (quoting Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 
U.S.at 347-48 (1916)). 
 63.  Id. at 93. 
 64.  Id. Professor Frost explains as follows: 
This type of intrastate disuniformity has always been viewed as a serious problem. It was 
the impetus for the Erie doctrine, in which the Court rejected the rule of Swift v. Ty-
10
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Furthermore, permitting state and federal courts to interpret the 
Constitution differently disregards “the equality principle of treating like 
cases alike and weaken[s] the integrity of the law itself by suggesting its 
meaning is not immutable.”65 In addition, “[t]he divergence between 
state and federal courts will inevitably . . . caus[e] some to question the 
competence of state courts (or, less likely, federal courts) and creating 
tension between the two systems.”66 Simply put, the Constitution’s text, 
and practical realities about contemporary judicial review, “supports the 
conclusion that the lower federal courts are superior to state courts when 
interpreting federal law.”67 
Most importantly, absent a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
enforcement of fundamental enumerated rights would be made difficult, 
if not impossible. Consider what would happen if a federal appeals court 
affirmed a district court’s ruling recognizing the right to assisted suicide 
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. If all or some of the states 
refused to follow the circuit court’s decision, then the right to assisted 
suicide would exist in name only unless the Court intervened or 
Congress acted. Likewise, if lower federal courts recognized a right to 
pre-viability abortion, but some states did not, then citizens living in a 
state that prohibited abortion would be denied the right entirely. 
In such a scenario, the state and federal courts would cease to share 
to responsibility in the collective enforcement of federal law and thus 
permanently alter our system of cooperative federalism. This would 
make every state’s constitution, and interpretations thereof by state court 
judges, equal if not superior to the federal constitution and give states 
nearly unchecked authority to disparage or completely disregard 
 
son because it “prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the state.” 
Avoiding intrastate disuniformity was also the basis for the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Van Dusen v. Barrack that a transferee court must apply the same state law that would 
have been applied by the transferor court, and for the decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Electric Manufacturing Co., that federal courts must apply the choice-of-law rules of the 
state in which they sit. And it explains why every federal court of appeals has adopted a 
rule requiring three-judge panels to follow the precedent set by a previous panel within 
the same circuit. Our federal judicial system is willing to tolerate disuniformi-
ty among the federal courts of appeals but not disuniformity within a geographic re-
gion. A rule requiring that state courts follow precedent set by the regional feder-
al court of appeals would similarly serve that goal. 
Id. 
 65.  Id. (stating that “if a federal law means ‘X’ when interpreted by one court but ‘Y’ when 
interpreted by another, then the public might presume that the courts are ‘unprincipled,’ 
incompetent, or that legal reasoning is ‘indeterminate,’ which ‘subverts the courts’ efforts to be seen 
as oracles of exogenous, objective, and determinant legal principles”). 
 66.  Id. at 96. 
 67.  Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). 
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enumerated, implied, and unenumerated rights. Furthermore, the 
Supremacy Clause and incorporation doctrine would have no force 
absent a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court or the enactment of federal 
legislation. This is not to say that state courts lack the power to interpret 
the federal constitution differently than federal courts.68 It is to say that, 
when states begin disregarding decisions of the lower federal courts, 
they can, in effect, undermine our entire system of cooperative 
federalism and deny basic freedoms that are “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”69 
These problems were exemplified in Ex parte State of Alabama ex 
rel. Alabama Policy Institute,70 where the Alabama Supreme Court held 
that a decision from the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Alabama invalidating the state’s ban on same-sex marriage 
was not binding on probate judges.71 After the Eleventh Circuit and U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to intervene and the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, the Alabama Supreme Court granted original jurisdiction and 
issued a writ of mandamus instructing its probate judges to deny 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.72 In doing so, the Court ignored 
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had already granted certiorari in 
another case to decide the fate of same-sex marriage bans nationwide.73 
Technically, the Alabama Supreme Court was correct that state courts 
are not bound by decisions of lower federal courts, but as a practical 
matter, if the Alabama Supreme Court’s approach were to become 
common practice, federal courts would essentially be stripped of their 
power to invalidate state laws that violate express and implied 
constitutional rights.74 States would be able nullify the rulings of all 
federal courts but one. 
Ultimately, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision is an example 
 
 68.  Id. at 93. 
 69.  See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding the right to assisted 
suicide was not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 70.  See Ex parte State ex rel. Alabama Policy Inst., No. 1140460 (Mar. 3, 2015), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/257589071/1140460-Petition-Granted. 
 71.  Id. at 39-40, 133. 
 72.  Id. at 133. 
 73.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 26, 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/. 
 74.  The Court has, through the Erie and abstention doctrines, tried to ensure harmony 
between state and federal courts. See Daniel C. Norris, The Final Frontier of Younger Abstention: 
The Judiciary’s Abdication of the Federal Court Removal Jurisdiction Statute, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (2003) (noting that “the related principles of comity and federalism require 
the federal courts to recognize the independence of state institutions and not interfere with 
legitimate state functions, even for the purpose of enforcing federal rights”). 
12
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of the disharmony that results when states refuse to follow lower federal 
court rulings. Professor Frost underscores the benefits of a system where 
state court defers to federal court decisions: 
[T]he Madisonian Compromise and the norm of concur-
rent state court jurisdiction over federal questions suggest that 
state courts are constitutionally adequate fora for the resolution 
of federal claims, but the fact that state courts are essential expositors 
of federal law does not render them federal courts’ equals when doing 
so. State courts lack the resources, experience, and insulation from po-
litical pressure that federal courts enjoy—problems that the Framers of 
the Constitution recognized and that continue to exist today. Further-
more, the expansion of the size and jurisdiction of 
the lower federal courts over the last two hundred years, coupled with 
diminished opportunities for Supreme Court review, suggest that 
the state courts should be more deferential to the federal courts of ap-
peals.75 
Simply put, “a state court should not be free to disregard its own 
regional court of appeals when addressing the meaning of federal law.”76 
C.Express, Implied, and Unenumerated Rights 
The selective incorporation doctrine and Supremacy Clause give 
the U.S. Supreme Court authority to create express, implied, and 
unenumerated rights. Currently, however, the Court only recognizes 
express and implied rights because it erroneously includes unenumerated 
rights within the latter category. The Court’s three-tiered framework for 
creating and enforcing fundamental rights is described in the table in the 
Introduction. 
By conflating implied and unenumerated rights, the Court has 
created rights that, although fundamental, are not inferable based on a 
reasonable reading of the text, and the Court has also disregarded the 
Ninth Amendment, which states that the Constitution “shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage other rights “retained by the people.”77 
The Ninth Amendment’s language means what it says: fundamental 
rights exist independently of the Constitution’s text, and citizens are 
entitled to full enjoyment of those rights. These fundamental rights are 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities. 
To be sure, it is not sufficient to say that the democratic process 
 
 75.  Frost, supra note 57, at 103. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  See U.S. CONST., amend. IX (emphasis added).  
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should be the source of unenumerated rights. If the states were given 
plenary power to create unenumerated rights through the democratic and 
political process, they would also have the power to recognize none at 
all. For example, a state could pass legislation refusing to recognize any 
rights other than those contained in the Bill of Rights and thereby write 
the Ninth Amendment out of existence. 
As discussed below, if states decided to enforce the federal/state 
citizenship dichotomy established in the Slaughter-House Cases,78 this is 
precisely what could and, in some states, would happen. This problem 
highlights the Court’s vital role in safeguarding citizens from arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty by the states. The proper path, however, is 
through the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
not the Due Process Clause.79 
Indeed, one must consider the two contexts within which the words 
“privileges and immunities” are mentioned. Article IV states that “the 
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states.”80 Broadly speaking, this provision 
prevents states from discriminating against non-residents.81 The 
Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States.”82 When read together with the Ninth Amendment, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities would seem to 
include the fundamental unenumerated rights of all citizens if United 
States citizenship were held to encompass, and not differ from, state 
citizenship. In the Slaughter-House Cases, however, the Court reached 
the opposite conclusion and made it all but impossible for the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause to be a source of 
unenumerated fundamental rights.83 
 
 78.  See infra Part D. 
 79.  U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. states in relevant part: 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their authority;—to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and con-
suls;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;—to controversies to which the 
United States shall be a party;—to controversies between two or more states;—between 
a state and citizens of another state;—between citizens of different states;—between citi-
zens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a 
state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. 
 80.  See U.S. CONST., art. IV. 
 81.  See Aaron Y. Tang, Privileges and Immunities, Public Education, and the Case for 
Public School Choice, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1138 (2011). 
 82.  See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. 
 83.  83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1872). 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss1/5
05 LAMPARELLO MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:23 PM 
2016] FUNDAMENTAL UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 193 
D. The Slaughter-House Cases Created an Unworkable and Unjust 
Distinction Between Federal and State Citizenship 
The Court has refused to rely on the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as a source of fundamental rights. In the Slaughter-House 
Cases,84 the Court upheld a Louisiana law creating a state-supported 
monopoly on the butchering of animals.85 The Court rejected the 
argument that the law created involuntary servitude and violated the 
privileges and immunities of potential competitors, holding that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause “protects only those rights ‘which owe 
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its 
Constitution, or its laws.’”86 As a result, “other fundamental rights—
rights that predated the creation of the Federal Government and that ‘the 
State governments were created to establish and secure’—were not 
protected by the Clause.”87 
The Court relied on the fact that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment referred to ‘the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States’”88 whereas the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause in Article IV referred to state citizenship.89 In the 
Court’s view, a broad reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
would “radically chang[e] the whole theory of the relations of the State 
and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to 
the people.”90 For these reasons, the Court held that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause protected only a limited number of rights, such as the 
right “to come to the seat of government to assert any claim [a citizen] 
may have upon that government, to transact any business he may have 
with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, [and] to engage in 
administering its functions . . . .”91 Four Justices dissented and argued 
that the Court’s opinion reduced the Privileges or Immunities Clause to 
“a vain and idle enactment.”92 The dissenters would have construed the 
Clause to protect “rights that are ‘in their nature . . . fundamental,’ 
including the right of every man to pursue his profession without the 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 82-83. 
 86.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010) (quoting the Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. at 79). 
 87.  Id. (quoting the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 76). 
 88.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 89.  Id. at 75. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 756. 
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imposition of unequal or discriminatory restrictions.”93 
The Court has never overturned the Slaughter-House Cases, 
although it has suggested in dicta that the Clause may safeguard some 
fundamental liberties. In Saenz v. Roe,94 the Court invalidated a 
California statute that limited the amount of welfare benefits that new 
residents could receive.95 The Court held that the statute infringed on 
non-residents’ fundamental right to travel, which included “the right of a 
citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State . . . and, for those 
travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated 
like other citizens of that State.”96 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens held that the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment 
safeguarded a non-resident’s right to enter another state and receive 
equal treatment under the law.97 Justice Stevens explained that the right 
to travel includes “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave 
another State . . . and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent 
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”98 
Although the protections afforded by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause “are not ‘absolute,’”99 it prohibits discrimination against non-
residents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination 
beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.”100 Justice 
Stevens held that California’s interest in saving money, although 
legitimate, could not be used as a vehicle to violate “the right of the 
newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by 
other citizens of the same State.”101 
 
 93.  Id. (quoting the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96-97 (Field, J., dissenting)). 
 94.  526 U.S. 489. 
 95.  Id. at 500.  
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 501 (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868)) (holding that “without 
some provision . . . removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other 
States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have 
constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now 
exists”).  
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 100.  Id. at 502 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).  
 101.  Id. at 503. Justice Stevens further stated: 
Despite fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority 
and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter–House Cases it has always been common 
ground that . . . one of the privileges conferred by this Clause “is that a citizen of the 
United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by 
a bonâ fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.  
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Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the Slaughter-House Cases 
should be overruled and that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is a 
legitimate source of fundamental rights. Thomas wrote that, “[u]nlike the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, which have assumed near-
talismanic status in modern constitutional law, the Court [has] all but 
read the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution.”102 
Justice Thomas relied on history and original intent of the Founders,103 
which showed that all citizens “which . . . dwell and inhabit within every 
or any of the said several Colonies . . . shall HAVE and enjoy all 
Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities . . . as if they had been abiding and 
born, within this our Realme of England.”104 As Justice Thomas 
explained, “the terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their 
counterparts) were understood to refer to those fundamental rights and 
liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by 
all persons.105 In addition, Thomas relied on a passage written by Justice 
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell,106 to support the argument that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protected unenumerated fundamental 
rights: 
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges 
and immunities that are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of 
right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all 
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which com-
pose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, 
and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would per-
haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, 
be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by 
the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to ac-
quire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the 
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole . . . . These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, 
strictly speaking, privileges and immunities . . . .107 
 
Id. 
 102.  Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of 
“Privileges or Immunities”: Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
295, 320 (1999) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 
however, pragmatic, is simply not a principled and faithful reading of the constitutional text.”). 
 103.  Saenz, 526 U.S. at 522. 
 104.  Id. at 523 (emphasis in original). 
 105.  Id. at 524. 
 106.  6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).  
 107.  Saenz, 526 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
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In fact, when the Framers adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, one 
senator quoted Corfield at length when explaining the purpose of the 
Clause.108 
In rejecting the federal/state citizenship dichotomy, Thomas relied 
on the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that 
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.”109 Thomas also cited language in the Amendment 
providing that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”110 
A natural reading of this language suggests that rights recognized by the 
federal government must also be recognized—or certainly not infringed 
without adequate justification—by the states. 
Although Justice Thomas viewed the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as a source of unenumerated rights, he believed that the Clause 
should be construed narrowly to protect only a limited number of 
rights.111 In his view, a broad construction of the Clause would 
impermissibly expand the Court’s power to create new rights: 
Although the majority appears to breathe new life into the Clause to-
day, it fails to address its historical underpinnings or its place in our 
constitutional jurisprudence. We should also consider whether the 
Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal pro-
tection and substantive due process jurisprudence. The majority’s fail-
ure to consider these important questions raises the specter that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause will become yet another convenient 
tool for inventing new rights, limited solely by the “predilections of 
those who happen at the time to be members of this Court.”112 
Justice Thomas’s view is not a reason to reject the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as a source of unenumerated rights. The issue of 
whether a specific provision in the Constitution gives the Court authority 
to create new rights is separate from the issue of whether workable 
standards can be identified to ensure that the exercise of this authority is 
appropriately constrained. In fact, Justice Thomas made that distinction 
 
 108.  Id. at 526; see also David R. Upham, Corfield v. Coryell and The Privileges and 
Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483 (2005) (discussing the various 
interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 808 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 111.  Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527 (stating that the “privileges or immunities of citizens were 
fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law”). 
 112.  Id. at 527-28 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)). 
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in his dissent, arguing that the Clause should be the source of 
unenumerated rights but be applied narrowly to create very few new 
rights.113 Thus, given that the Court has developed such standards in its 
substantive rights jurisprudence, there is no reason to suggest that a 
framework more closely tied to the text will lead to judicial 
overreaching.114 For example, in determining whether to designate a 
right as fundamental, the Court has considered “the ‘traditions and 
(collective) conscience of our people’ to determine whether a principle is 
‘so rooted . . . as to be ranked as fundamental’ . . . [and] is of such a 
character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions.”115 What it will do, however, is enhance the 
Court’s institutional legitimacy and reflect a commitment to a decision-
making process that remains within the bounds of the Court’s Article III 
power. 
  Ultimately, the federal and state citizenship dichotomy 
recognized in the Slaughter-House Cases could, absent a ruling by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, permit states to disregard fundamental liberties 
enumerated in the Constitution and implied by the federal courts. For 
example, the federal component of citizenry might provide citizens with 
a right to same-sex marriage, but the state aspect could prevent citizens 
from enjoying those rights. This is an odd and certainly unjust state of 
affairs, particularly because the Framers likely would not have drafted 
the Bill of Rights with the intent to give states the power to nullify 
decisions by the federal courts and disregard the Ninth Amendment 
altogether. 
Ironically, the Court’s unreasonably narrow interpretation of the 
Privilege or Immunities Clause has led it to create broad unenumerated 
rights through the Due Process Clause, even though the justification for 
doing so is far less compelling. The text of the Clause states that “no 
state shall deprive citizens of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law,”116 which protects citizens from arbitrary or unfair 
 
 113.  See David C. Durst, Justice Clarence Thomas’s Interpretation of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause: McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Future of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 
U. TOL. L. REV. 933, 956 (2011). 
 114.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that fundamental rights 
are those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “fundamental to the 
Americanscheme of ordered liberty”) (internal citation omitted). 
 115.  Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1215, 1221 (1990) (quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Powell v. Ala., 287 
U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).  
 116.  U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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procedures.117 Nonetheless, the Court has held that “[a]lthough a literal 
reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures 
by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at least 105 
years . . . the Clause has been understood to contain 
a substantive component.”118 This has engendered substantial criticism 
from legal scholars who have called substantive due process “an 
ungainly concept,”119 and “a contradiction in terms,”120 akin to “green, 
pastel redness.”121 As Justice Thomas argued in Saenz, “the demise of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause has contributed in no small part to 
the current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.”122 
This is not to say that the rights recognized under the substantive 
due process doctrine are unworthy of being fundamental. For example, 
the right to terminate a pregnancy, to make consensual sexual choices, 
and to refuse unwanted medical treatment are central to autonomy and 
personal liberty.123 Laws abridging these rights are—like the distinction 
between federal and state citizenship—are inimical to a society premised 
on equality and self-determination. It is to say that the Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause are more legitimate 
sources of these rights because the Founders intended them to protect 
substantive unenumerated liberties. 
III. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
 
The Ninth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause can provide the Court with a credible basis upon 
which to create unenumerated rights that are distinct from implied rights, 
that exist independently of the Constitution’s text, and that protect 
 
 117.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (holding that “[d]ue Process is flexible 
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”).  
 118.  Planned Parenthood of Se.Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 119.  CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 443 
(Aspen 3d. ed. 2009). 
 120.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 
(1980) 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Kevin Maher, 
Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, the Right to Travel, and the Resurrection of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 105, 107 
(2001) (stating that, “[a]s a result of the Saenz decision, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has suddenly become a viable means for plaintiffs to challenge the 
constitutionality of state legislation.”). 
 123.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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citizens against arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 
A. Justice Goldberg’s Reliance on the Ninth Amendment in Griswold 
The Court’s tenuous path toward creating unenumerated rights is 
the result of misplaced reliance on the Due Process Clause and of the 
Court’s failure to rely on the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. 
In Griswold, perhaps the most important case to establish the 
unenumerated right to privacy, the Court mentioned but did not rely 
heavily on the Ninth Amendment.124 Instead, the Court embraced a 
broader formulation of implied rights, holding that “specific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance.”125 The problem with 
Griswold is that the Constitution’s “penumbras” are not anchored to any 
specific provision in the text, much like the Court’s substantive due 
process jurisprudence is not based on a workable standard of liberty. 
Importantly, Justice Goldberg concurred in Griswold and criticized 
the majority for failing to rely on the Ninth Amendment as the source of 
an unenumerated, not an implied, right to privacy: 
The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the 
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional funda-
mental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist 
alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first 
eight constitutional amendments . . . . The Amendment . . . was intro-
duced in Congress . . . and passed the House and Senate with little or 
no debate and virtually no change in language. It was proffered to quiet 
expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not 
be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights and that the specific 
mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial that others 
were protected.126 
As Justice Goldberg explained, the purpose of the Ninth 
Amendment was “to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of 
the well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a 
negation in all others; and, e converso, that a negation in particular cases 
implies an affirmation in all others.”127 Like Justice Washington in 
 
 124.  Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 125.  Id. at 483-44. 
 126.  Id. at 488-89. 
 127.  Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 626-27 (5th ed. 1891)).  
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Corfield, Justice Goldberg concluded that the Ninth Amendment was the 
proper source upon which to protect individual liberty: 
While the Ninth Amendment—and indeed the entire Bill of Rights—
originally concerned restrictions upon federal power, the subsequently 
enacted Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States as well from 
abridging fundamental personal liberties. And, the Ninth Amendment, 
in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically mentioned in the 
first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of 
other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as 
federal, infringement. In sum, the Ninth Amendment . . . lends strong 
support to the view that the “liberty” protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or 
the States is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first 
eight amendments.128 
  Simply put, the Framers did not intend “that the first eight 
amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights 
which the Constitution guaranteed to the people.”129  Rather, there are 
“fundamental personal rights . . . which are protected from abridgment 
by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution.”130 In Bowers v. Hardwick,131 Justice Blackmun agreed 
with this principle in dissenting from the Court’s opinion upholding a 
Georgia statute that criminalized consensual sodomy.132 Justice 
Blackmun argued that the Ninth Amendment should be considered “one 
of the specific constitutional provisions giving ‘life and substance’ to our 
understanding of privacy.”133 
Ultimately, Justices Goldberg and Blackmun’s opinions are 
consistent with a “residual rights reading” of the Ninth Amendment and 
the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.134 They 
also recognize a meaningful distinction between implied and 
unenumerated rights. 
B. The Ninth Amendment Protects Rights Independent of the Bill of 
Rights 
Although most agree that the Ninth Amendment protects rights not 
 
 128.  Id. at 493. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 496. 
 131.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 132.  Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 133.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 134.  McAffee, supra note 115, at 1221.  
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enumerated in the Constitution, scholars continue to debate the 
Amendment’s original meaning.135 One view is that the Ninth 
Amendment is a source of residual or negative rights that serve to limit 
the power of government.136 Other scholars view the Ninth Amendment 
as a source of affirmative or positive rights, irrespective of whether those 
rights further the interest in limited government.137 One scholar 
describes the residual rights view as follows: 
It simply holds that, for the drafters of the Constitution, the scheme of 
limited government embodied in the system of enumerated powers was 
a means of reserving rights to the people. On this reading, the purpose 
of the ninth amendment is to ensure these reserved rights—
what Madison called “the great residuum” of rights the people pos-
sessed under the unamended Constitution—against any adverse infer-
ence that might be drawn from the addition of a bill of rights . . . 
the amendment’s purpose is limited to securing these reserved rights 
and does not extend to securing unenumerated affirmative limitations 
on the powers the Constitution granted to the federal government.138 
Consequently, the focus is “on preserving against any adverse 
inference the mechanism of a government of limited powers whereby 
these rights are retained.”139 At the same time, the “conception of 
‘rights’ . . . is inclusive enough to extend to a broad range of privileges 
and prerogatives that modern thinkers would not typically identify as 
moral or legal rights . . . [including] those individual rights that we 
might call ‘fundamental’ and which the framers might have called 
‘natural.’”140 Put differently, the “rights secured residually are not an 
exclusive category of interests distinct from the rights that might be 
secured by affirmative limitations on government power.”141 
Advocates for the affirmative rights view contend that the Ninth 
Amendment protects unenumerated rights regardless of whether they 
operate to limit the power of government: 
The new orthodoxy . . . holds that the ninth amendment refers to con-
 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  Id. at 1220-21; see also Joseph F. Kadlec, Employing the Ninth Amendment to 
Supplement Substantive Due Process: Recognizing the History of the Ninth Amendment and the 
Existence of Nonfundamental Unenumerated Rights, 48 B.C. L. REV. 387 (2007); Mark C. Niles, 
Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal 
Autonomy Rights, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 85 (2000). 
 137.  McAffee, supra note 115, at 1222. 
 138.  Id. at 1219-20.  
 139.  Id. at 1221. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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stitutional rights as we generally think of them today—legally-
enforceable, affirmatively defined limitations on governmental power 
on behalf of individual claimants . . . the rights its adherents conceive 
of are to be defined independently of, and may serve to limit the scope 
of, powers granted to the national government by the Constitution. The 
proponents of this reading for the most part contend that 
the ninth amendment embodies the tradition of an unwritten fundamen-
tal law of constitutionally enforceable individual rights, most frequent-
ly including the right to privacy.142 
Notwithstanding the conceptual differences between supporters of 
residual and affirmative rights, both view the Amendment as securing 
rights that exist independently of the Bill of Rights. As one scholar 
notes, the residual rights view “does not lack a meaningful ‘rights 
focus,’”143 but reflects the principle that, “for the drafters of the 
Constitution, the scheme of limited government embodied in the system 
of enumerated powers was a means of reserving rights to the people.”144 
In other words, implied and unenumerated rights are not 
synonymous, and distinguishing between them will have a beneficial 
impact on the Court’s institutional legitimacy. As stated above, under the 
First Amendment the Court has recognized an implied right of 
association, which is necessary to enable citizens to fully exercise the 
core right to free speech.145 In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court 
has held that citizens have an implied right to effective and competent 
counsel, which gives meaning to the textual guarantee of assistance of 
counsel.146 On the other hand, protecting citizens from deprivations of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law does not imply or 
even remotely support a right to terminate a pregnancy or to make 
 
 142.  Id. at 1222. 
 143.  Id. at 1219.  
 144.  Id.  
 145.  See Margaret Tarkington, Freedom of Attorney-Client Association, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 
1071, 1077-78 (2012). Professor Tarkington explains the derivative nature of the right to associate 
under the First Amendment: 
The word “association” is not itself found in the Constitution. Although occasionally cit-
ing due process as the source of the right of association, the Court has generally held that 
freedom of association derives from the First Amendment, which expressly protects 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition. The Court has explained that 
the right of association is implied by these enumerated rights because it is essential to se-
curing those other First Amendment rights, and, in fact, gives the enumerated rights ”life 
and substance.” Thus, although freedom of association ”is not expressly included in 
the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully 
meaningful.”  
Id. 
 146.  See U.S. CONST., amend. VI.  
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consensual sexual choices. Certainly, these rights are not necessary to 
ensure that states adopt fair procedures before depriving citizens of 
liberty. Yet the right to reproductive freedom and sexual autonomy are 
essential if citizens are to live in a free and autonomous society. The 
problem is not in holding that they are fundamental rights. It is in relying 
on the Due Process Clause as the textual basis for those rights, 
particularly when the rights to abortion and consensual sexual conduct 
are based on rights—privacy and liberty—that are themselves implied. 
C. Linking the Ninth Amendment to the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause 
The key to developing credible unenumerated rights jurisprudence 
is linking the Ninth Amendment’s language—retention of other rights 
not contained in the Constitution—to the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause’s prohibition on “any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”147 This approach will allow 
the Court to abandon its much-maligned substantive due process 
jurisprudence148 while preserving its counter-majoritarian role to ensure 
that the democratic process is not a vehicle by which the states can 
infringe express, implied, or unenumerated rights. Simply stated, the 
substantive due process doctrine was the wrong path by which to create 
unenumerated rights, and the Court’s current reluctance to create such 
rights is an outgrowth of this failed jurisprudence.149 
 
 147.  U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
 148.  See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, The Wolves and the Sheep of Constitutional Law: A Review 
Essay on Kermit Roosevelt’s The Myth of Judicial Activism, 23 J.L. & POL. 1, 16 (2007). Professor 
Sandefur describes the arguments against substantive due process as follows: 
One of the primary targets of the Progressive critique of the judiciary was substantive 
due process theory. This made sense, because due process was an area of the law where 
the normative claims of America’s constitutional order had been most obviously assert-
ed. The famous dissents of Holmes and Brandeis are the artifacts of this conflict: they 
and their allies contended that the Lochner-era Court was implementing normative theo-
ries “which a large part of the country does not entertain” and that the Constitution was 
not intended to implement any consensus about right and wrong—instead, it is “made for 
people of fundamentally differing views” who negotiate for political power in the state. 
The Due Process Clause should therefore not be used to enforce outdated notions of jus-
tice, but instead should be seen as a flexible guarantee of some type of procedural regu-
larity. In fact, Holmes regarded the Due Process Clause as “the usual last resort” for 
those who had no real argument. In his view, the Clause required merely that a legisla-
ture enact the statute permitting it to do the complained-of act, or that a court follow a 
regular procedure when enforcing it. That this allowed the legislature to determine (or 
eliminate) the limits on its own authority was considered irrelevant.  
Id. 
 149.  See, e.g., Niles, supra note 136.  
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Moreover, relying on the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause would not transform unenumerated rights into 
implied rights because neither protects specific substantive liberties like 
the Bill of Rights’ first eight amendments. Additionally, it would not 
lead to the evisceration of rights currently recognized under the Court’s 
due process formulation.150 The Privileges or Immunities Clause would 
still guarantee “more than fair process, as the ‘liberty’ it protects 
includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”151 It would also 
provide “heightened protection against government interference with 
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”152 This would include, 
but not be limited to, the right to marry, to have children, to control the 
education of one’s children, to make consensual sexual choices, to use 
contraception, to bodily integrity, and to refuse medical treatment.153 As 
a result, the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
would include the implied rights already recognized by the Court and lay 
the groundwork for recognizing other unenumerated rights that are 
implicit in a free an autonomous society. 
Ironically, this approach could garner the support of both 
originalists and living constitutionalists.154 The text and purpose of the 
 
 150.  See David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental 
Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 795 (1996) 
(discussing the various interpretive theories that the Court has used when recognizing new rights 
under the Constitution). 
 151.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 721 U.S 702, 719-20 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (the Due Process Clause “protects individual liberty against 
‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’”). 
 152.  Id. at 720 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)). 
 153.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marriage); Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to have children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(right to control the education of one’s children); Griswold v. City of Chicago, 381 U.S. 479 (right 
to use contraception); Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (right to make consensual sexual choices; 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (bodily integrity); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (right to abortion); Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S 
261 (1990) (right to refuse unwanted medical treatment). 
 154.  See Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMM. 
353, 357-61 (2007). The differences between originalism and living constitutionalism are based on 
disagreements about the manner in which the text should be interpreted: 
In summary, a core difference between the originalists and the living constitutionalists 
turns on what we might call interpretative mechanics—and Balkin aligns himself with 
the originalist form. Originalists exclude many “extrinsic” constitutional modalities in 
their first pass at any particular constitutional question; living constitutionalists let it all 
in from the start. Discussions of consequences, underlying principles of political morali-
ty, prudence, doctrine, rule of law considerations: all these are relevant (even if not, per-
haps, equally relevant) for living constitutionalists at the first moment that a question 
of constitutional interpretation presents itself. Originalists either rule these considera-
tions out of the interpretive game entirely or admit them only in later conceptual stages 
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Ninth Amendment is to protect unenumerated fundamental rights, and 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is “understood to refer to those 
fundamental rights and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens 
and, more broadly, by all persons.”155 
On its face, the Privileges or Immunities Clause appears to protect a 
category of fundamental rights (called “Privileges or Immunities”) 
from abridgment (“lessening”) by the making or enforcing of any state 
law . . . it seems as if it protects fundamental rights, however derived, 
from abridgment . . . . The historical evidence suggests that the framers 
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, in fact, thought the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was the most important Clause in the 
amendment.”156 
Indeed, an “[e]xamination of the history of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause confirms that this is in fact how the Clause should be 
read.”157 As the Court noted before deciding the Slaughter-House Cases, 
the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits any state from abridging the 
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, whether its 
own citizens or any others.”158 
Ultimately, establishing three categories of rights under the 
Constitution would enable the Court to fully protect enumerated and 
unenumerated rights while remaining faithful to the Constitution’s text 
and the democratic process. Under this proposed framework, the Court 
would have the authority to create implied rights that are based on 
reasonable interpretations of the Constitution’s text, that reflect the 
underlying purposes and historical understandings of particular 
enumerated rights, and that account for circumstances that the founders 
could not have foreseen. In addition, the Court would have the power to 
create unenumerated rights by relying on the text of the Ninth 
Amendment and Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than by 
inventing questionable legal doctrines such as substantive due process. 
In so doing, the Court can have a meaningful role in ensuring that state 
and federal laws do not infringe on individual liberty while 
 
of the interpretive enterprise. 
Id. 
 155.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 156.  Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s 
Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 1097, 1109 
(2004). 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & 
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870). 
27
Lamparello: Fundamental Unenumerated Rights
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
05 LAMPARELLO MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:23 PM 
206 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:179 
simultaneously respecting principles of federalism and adhering to the 
checks that the Constitution envisions for the judicial branch. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The failure to link the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause for the purpose of creating unenumerated 
fundamental rights has been a persistent but rarely discussed aspect of 
the Court’s jurisprudence. That should change. There need not be an 
ongoing tension between the Court counter-majoritarian role and the 
authority of states to govern through the democratic process. If the 
Constitution’s text gives the Court a solid foundation upon which to 
recognize new rights and thereby create a more just society, then the 
exercise of that power is fundamentally democratic. The Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause provides that path 
and, ironically, results in a process of decision-making that is fairer than 
the Court’s current due process jurisprudence. 
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